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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD￿s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF￿s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
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Abstract
Unlike the other East Asian economies which sought IMF emergency credit facilities after
borrowing heavily from abroad, the Malaysian authorities simply never had to go to the Fund as
prudential regulations introduced earlier had limited foreign borrowings, especially short-term
credit. Instead, its crisis was due to massive portfolio investment inflows into the stock market.
With the crisis, currency depreciation and stock market declines formed a vicious cycle,
exacerbated by contagion and policy responses as well as official rhetoric undermining market
confidence, especially in the latter half of 1997. From December 1997, the adoption of more
orthodox pro-cyclical policies made the downturn worse. Before mid-1998, new fiscal measures
were adopted to reflate the economy, later augmented by the currency and capital control
measures from September. Looking at the crisis in August 1998, when the United States still
showed little inclination to do anything to improve the situation, the Malaysian measures made
good sense. The September 1998 Malaysian controls were undoubtedly well designed and effective
in closing down the offshore ringgit market without discouraging greenfield foreign direct
investment. The Malaysian experience shows that imposing emergency capital controls on
outflows did not have the disastrous effects its opponents claim it would. But, coming 14 months
after the crisis began, they were too late to stem capital flight, which had already taken place,
resulting in the 80 per cent collapse of the stock market index. The capital controls were amended
in February 1999 and ended in September 1999. They prevented more capital from leaving
owing to the uncertainty induced by the economic and political developments of early September
1998.
All the crisis economies turned around from late 1998, while Malaysia took longer, recovering
from the second quarter of 1999. The recovery was stronger than in Thailand and in Indonesia
in 1999 and 2000, although it lagged behind that in the Republic of Korea. The Governments of
the Republic of Korea and Malaysia were bolder in their fiscal reflationary efforts, and also
worked faster at bank re-capitalization and corporate restructuring. The pre-Y2K demand for
electronics helped Malaysia and the Republic of Korea more than the others. Malaysia also
benefited from higher petroleum and palm oil prices, while the depth of the 1998 recession in
Southeast Asia was partly due to El Nino weather effects on agricultural output, and not just the
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Director Horst K￿hler acknowledged that Malaysia￿s
September 1998 controls seemed to have worked.
He also recognized the right of countries to impose
temporary controls on capital outflows to cope with
crisis situations. This endorsement of controls on
outflows went much further than IMF Senior Deputy
Managing Director Stanley Fischer￿s 1998 grudging
endorsement of controls on inflows, as in Chile and
Colombia.
In mid-2003, IMF research ￿ by Economic
Counsellor and Research Department Director
Kenneth Rogoff and his colleagues ￿ acknowledged
that financial liberalization did not seem to have
contributed to economic growth. More heterodox
research has found more adverse consequences in-
cluding deflationary macroeconomic policy pressures,
slower growth and greater vulnerability to crisis. In
East Asia and Latin America, inflow surges have
been attributed to asset (especially stock) price bub-
bles, consumption binges, misallocation of financial
resources, including ￿mal-investments￿, as well as
greater vulnerability to currency, banking and other
financial crises.
It has also been shown that the promised gains
from international financial liberalization have not
materialized. While there have occasionally been
episodes to the contrary, the overwhelming evidence
suggests that net capital flows following capital ac-
count convertibility have been from the capital poor
to the capital rich, rather in the opposite direction.
This has been true of the transition economies, Africa,
Latin America and most of Asia for most of the last
two decades. While there have undoubtedly been
temporary net flows into East Asia during the early
and mid-1990s and into Latin America at other times,
the overall record clearly undermines the promises
of its proponents.
Similarly, there is little evidence of a signifi-
cant and sustained decline in the costs of capital for
various reasons, perhaps including the increased
share of financial rents in the OECD economies since
the 1970s and the mixed consequences of financial
deepening. There is also little evidence that finan-
cial deepening has reduced financial volatility and
vulnerability to crisis. While some old sources of
volatility and vulnerability have undoubtedly been
checked by the new financial instruments and de-
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rivatives, there has clearly been a significant increase
in the frequency of currency, banking and other fi-
nancial crises in the recent period. While the origins,
nature and consequences of recent crises have un-
doubtedly changed over time, and there may have
been some advances in crisis aversion and manage-
ment, this has not checked the occurrence and
frequency of financial crises. Economic liberaliza-
tion and international financial integration have also
resulted in the greater likelihood of cross-border
transmission of financial crises, acknowledged by
more frequent references to the dangers of contagion.
International financial liberalization has accom-
panied the ascendance of international finance,
reflected in institutional reform and public policy,
e.g. advocacy of greater central bank independence
from government executives, which has inevitably
resulted in the greater influence on macroeconomic
￿ especially monetary ￿ policy of financial, includ-
ing foreign interests, usually reflected in ￿market
expectations￿ as well as policy advice from the inter-
national financial institutions. International financial
liberalization has also undermined financial policy
instruments and institutions that have been so im-
portant for industrial or investment policy initiatives
associated with developmental states over the last
two centuries.
Importantly, the earlier Washington Consensus
advocacy of financial liberalization was not based
on the theoretical analysis advocating financial lib-
eralization, or at least one of its early proponents,
namely Ronald McKinnon. His original critique with
Shaw was based on the singular case of the Repub-
lic of Korea during the 1960s when savings rates
continued to rise despite alleged financial repres-
sion. McKinnon was apparently so alarmed by the
wrongly sequenced advocacy of financial liberali-
zation that he felt compelled to write The Order of
Financial Liberalization where he reiterated that
capital account liberalization should be the last ￿ and
certainly not the first ￿ step in financial liberaliza-
tion. However, this has not discouraged advocates
of financial liberalization from pushing strongly for
universal capital account liberalization.
In 1997, the Interim Committee of the IMF
agreed that the Fund￿s Articles of Agreement be
amended to include currency convertibility for capi-
tal transactions. First mooted in its April meeting,
the decision was confirmed in Hong Kong (China)
in September after the East Asian currency and fi-
nancial crises had begun in Thailand, spreading
immediately to the rest of Southeast Asia, in July.
Since then, Fund officials have reiterated that capi-
tal account liberalization should become one of its
basic objectives (Fischer, 1998).
Ironically, this decision was made and later
confirmed as the world￿s first serious capital account
crisis was building up and after it later broke. It is
now generally agreed in East Asia, if not elsewhere,
that the Fund exacerbated the crises by insisting on
inappropriate policies. In early 1998, three spokes-
men of the Washington Consensus ￿ Alan Greenspan,
Larry Summers and Michel Camdessus ￿ blamed
the crises on East Asian corporate governance mal-
practices. Since then, there has been no explicit mea
culpa from the protagonists involved, although it is
now grudgingly acknowledged that financial liber-
alization has not contributed to growth in emerging
markets.
In September 1998, the Malaysian authorities
introduced capital and other currency controls. This
was clearly an important challenge to the prevailing
orthodoxy, especially as promoted by the Fund.
While it is moot how crucial the controls were for
the subsequent V-shaped recovery, it is nevertheless
clear that they do not seem to have caused any sig-
nificant permanent damage, as predicted by some
critics. Different sides in the debate now invoke the
1998 Malaysian controls for all kinds of purposes,
often contributing more heat than light.
This study seeks to explain the circumstances
in which the controls were introduced as well as as-
sess their nature and impact before drawing some
general lessons of relevance to other emerging mar-
ket economies. In considering the context, the paper
considers the recent evolution of the Malaysian
financial system and regulation in the decade
preceding the outbreak of the crisis in mid-1997.
Early Malaysian policy responses from July 1997
until September 1998 are then considered. This is
followed by a detailed consideration of the nature
of the control measures and an assessment of their
efficacy. Finally, the actual significance of the Ma-
laysian controls is emphasized before drawing some
policy lessons. Annex 1 provides a review of the
range of different capital control measures, while
annex 2 summarizes the Malaysian controls on in-
flows introduced and withdrawn in 1994.3 Malaysia￿s September 1998 Controls: Background, Context, Impacts, Comparisons, Implications, Lessons
Capital flows and crisis
For several decades, foreign capital inflows into
Malaysia have augmented the high domestic sav-
ings rate to raise the domestic investment rate as well
as Malaysian investments abroad in the nineties.
Compared to most of its neighbours in the East Asian
region, the Malaysian Central Bank authorities were
generally more cautious and prudent about financial
liberalization, both domestically and internationally.
Malaysia experienced a severe banking crisis in the
late 1980s, following the mid-1980s￿ recession and
stock market collapse, when ￿non-performing loans￿
(then defined on a six-month basis) reached 30 per
cent of total commercial banks￿ lending portfolios.
In 1989, the authorities legislated the Banking and
Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) that sought to
improve banking supervision and regulation.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
and other banking regulations as well as other bank-
ing practices inadvertently encouraged short-term
debt ￿ compared to medium- or long-term debt ￿ in
the exposure of the OECD countries-based banks,
especially to emerging markets or developing coun-
tries. Loans for less than a year only required 20 per
cent capital backing compared to full (100 per cent)
capital backing for loans for a year or more. Fur-
ther, the degree of the Malaysian exposure to such
short-term debt was partly mitigated by more pru-
dent central bank regulations, supervision and
enforcement, as well as limiting foreign borrowings
by the Malaysian banks as well as corporations.
Compared to the others, much more Malaysian
debt was long-term ￿ rather than short-term ￿ in na-
ture. Monetary policy as well as banking supervision
in Malaysia had generally been much more prudent
compared to the other crisis victims. Banks in Ma-
laysia had not been allowed to borrow heavily from
abroad to lend in the domestic market, as in the other
economies. Such practices involved currency and
term mismatches, which increased financial system
vulnerability to foreign bankers￿ confidence as well
as pressure on the exchange rate pegs. Thus,
Malaysian Central Bank regulation and earlier con-
solidation of the banking sector helped ensure its
greater robustness compared to its neighbours.
Malaysia accumulated relatively less foreign
borrowings than most other crisis-hit countries with
a smaller proportion of debt of short-term maturity.
For instance, in June 1997, short-term debt as a share
of total reserves for Malaysia was approximately
60 per cent, significantly lower than for the Repub-
lic of Korea (more than 200 per cent), Indonesia
(about 170 per cent) and Thailand (just under 150 per
cent). The costs of hedging foreign loans in Malay-
sia were relatively lower compared to its neighbours
besides Singapore, though there are anecdotal claims
that the central bank actually discouraged Malaysian
external borrowers from hedging their debt.
Malaysia￿s total external debt to foreign ex-
change reserves ratio was becoming dangerously
high before the crisis, reaching 139.6 per cent in 1996
before jumping to 298.2 per cent in 1997 (Jomo, ed.,
2001: table 5.13). As the economic recession deep-
ened in 1998, foreign borrowings decreased to 1996
levels, after peaking at Malaysia Ringgits (RM)
29.2 billion in 1997. With a lower proportion of
short-term loans compared to the other East Asian
economies hit by the crisis, fluctuations in foreign
bank borrowings in Malaysia have been less severe.
In the early and mid-1980s, Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) inflows were significantly
augmented by increased inflows of portfolio capi-
tal, mainly to invest in the booming stock market
accompanying the decade long boom from the late
1980s induced by FDI from Japan and the first gen-
eration newly industrialized economies, especially
Taiwan Province of China, and Singapore. Such
inflows were encouraged by the promotion of
￿emerging market economies￿ by the international
financial institutions from the late 1980s after the
international sovereign debt crisis of the early and
mid-1980s following the Volcker/US Fed-induced
world recession.
Thus, there was considerable, but partial and
uneven financial liberalization dating back to the
eighties, which was slowed by the mid-1980s￿ stock
market scandals and recession as well as the subse-
quent banking crisis. While exercising caution and
prudence with regards to private sector foreign bank
borrowings, the authorities actively encouraged de-
velopment of the capital market in Malaysia.
Official efforts included considerable promo-
tion of the Kuala Lumpur￿s ￿newly emerging￿ stock
market, growing central bank speculative activity
abroad (until it lost at least sixteen billion ringgit
after the sterling collapse of September 1992) and
greater capital account convertibility. By splitting4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 36
from the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), the
Malaysian authorities ensured that such flows di-
rectly entered the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(KLSE). Such portfolio capital inflows were far more
significant in Malaysia than foreign bank borrow-
ings, which were officially discouraged by the central
bank authorities who generally required evidence of
significant foreign exchange earnings from deploy-
ment of such external loans.
Malaysia thus succeeded in attracting consider-
able capital inflows during the early and mid-1990s,
but these were more modest than in the Republic of
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, where foreign bank
borrowings ballooned in the early and mid-1990s
(see table 1). However, Malaysia was far more suc-
cessful in attracting portfolio capital flows, which
are arguably even more volatile than bank borrow-
ings. Hence, unlike other crisis-affected economies
that attracted considerable, mainly short-term dol-
lar denominated bank loans, albeit from continental
European and Japanese banks, Malaysia￿s vulner-
ability was primarily due to the volatility of interna-
tional portfolio capital flows into its stock market.
International financial liberalization succeeded
in generating net capital inflows into Malaysia, and
much of East Asia during the early and mid-1990s,
unlike many other developing and transitional econo-
mies that experienced net outflows. Increased foreign
capital inflows reduced foreign exchange constraints,
allowing the financing of additional imports, and
thus, inadvertently encouraging current account defi-
cits. Such foreign capital inflows into Malaysia also
adversely affected factor payment outflows, export
and import propensities, the terms of trade and capi-
tal flight, and thus, the balance of payments. But
financial liberalization also exacerbated systemic
instability and reduced the scope for the develop-
mental government interventions responsible for the
region￿s economic miracle.
A major role for FDI appears to have been of-
ficially encouraged in Malaysia in order to reduce
reliance on ethnic Chinese capital and its likely po-
litical consequences. Malaysia￿s heavy dependence
on foreign direct investment in gross domestic capi-
tal formation, especially manufacturing investments,
has limited the development of domestic entrepre-
neurship as well as many other indigenous economic
capabilities by requiring greater reliance on foreign
capabilities, often associated with some types of FDI.
Hence, FDI domination (well above the average for
developing countries) of internationally competitive
manufacturing weakened domestic industrialists,
inadvertently enhancing the dominance of finance capi-
tal and its influence over economic policy making.
In contrast to the limited influence of Malaysian
industrial capital, finance capital was clearly far more
influential in Malaysia, enhanced by the country￿s
British colonial inheritance and more recent Ameri-
can cultural influences favouring finance over
industry. The influence of financial interests was
enhanced by the many and extensive investments of
the Malaysian authorities in the financial sector, more
than any other sector of the Malaysian economy,
partly due to previous interventions to bail out banks
after earlier financial crises. The stock market and
other property asset price bubbles due to capital in-
flows induced ￿wealth effects￿ which benefited
much of the middle class as well. However, there is
no evidence that these portfolio capital inflows ac-
tually contributed to domestic capital formation and
thus growth rates, rather than asset price bubbles and
consumer binges.
After mid-1995, the Southeast Asian currency
pegs to the dollar ￿ which had enhanced the region￿s
competitiveness as the dollar declined for a decade
after the 1985 Plaza accord ￿ became a growing li-
ability as the yen began to depreciate once again.
The overvalued currencies became attractive targets
for speculative attacks, resulting in futile, but costly
defences of the Thai baht and the Malaysian ringgit,
and the rapid regional spread of herd panic called
contagion.
After the Thai baht was floated on 2 July 1997,
like other currencies in the region, the ringgit was
under strong pressure, especially because, like Thai-
land, Malaysia had maintained large current account
deficits during the early and mid-nineties. The mon-
etary authorities￿ efforts to defend the ringgit actually
strengthened the national currency against the
greenback for a few days before the futile ringgit
defence effort was given up by mid-July. The failed
ringgit defence effort is widely believed to have cost
over nine billion ringgit.
The ringgit fluctuated wildly until mid-1998,
weeks before the ringgit was fixed at RM3.8 against
the dollar on 2 September 1998. While much of the
downward pressure on the ringgit was external, in-
appropriate political rhetoric and policy measures
exacerbated the situation. Malaysia￿s foreign ex-5 Malaysia￿s September 1998 Controls: Background, Context, Impacts, Comparisons, Implications, Lessons
Table 1
NET PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO MALAYSIA, INDONESIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THAILAND, 1990￿2001
(US$ billion)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Malaysia
Private flows, net 1.82 5.77 8.91 11.37 1.51 7.85 10.04 2.56 -2.72 1.45 -0.77 -0.12
Equity investments, net 2.08 4.17 4.06 4.30 2.69 3.74 4.81 4.89 2.45 1.45 -0.77 -0.12
Direct investment, net 2.33 4.00 5.18 5.01 4.34 4.18 5.08 5.14 2.16 2.47 1.76 0.29
Portfolio investment, net -0.25 0.17 -1.12 -0.71 -1.65 -0.44 -0.27 -0.25 0.28 -1.02 -2.53 -0.41
Private creditors, net -0.26 1.60 4.85 7.07 -1.19 4.11 5.23 -2.33 -5.17 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Commercial banks, net 0.85 1.31 3.63 4.22 -5.07 0.03 3.34 -0.98 -2.68 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nonbank, net -1.11 0.29 1.22 2.85 3.88 4.08 1.89 -1.35 -2.49 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Indonesia
Private flows, net 4.02 4.40 5.27 5.08 3.70 10.25 11.51 -0.34 -13.85 -9.92 -9.99 -8.25
Equity investments, net 1.00 1.47 1.69 3.45 5.38 7.84 10.60 1.87 -2.23 -4.54 -6.46 -3.52
Direct investment, net 1.09 1.48 1.78 1.65 1.50 3.74 5.59 4.50 -0.36 -2.75 -4.55 -3.28
Portfolio investment, net -0.09 -0.01 -0.09 1.81 3.88 4.10 5.01 -2.63 -1.88 -1.79 -1.91 -0.24
Private creditors, net 3.02 2.93 3.58 1.63 -1.68 2.41 0.91 -2.21 -11.61 -5.38 -3.53 -4.73
Commercial banks, net 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.36 0.53 1.95 -0.76 -0.28 -2.27 0.13 -1.42 -1.87
Nonbank, net 3.02 2.93 3.58 0.27 -2.20 0.46 1.67 -1.93 -9.34 -5.51 -2.11 -2.86
Republic of Korea
Private flows, net 3.75 7.87 8.07 5.80 11.55 18.19 24.91 -13.56 -12.30 10.10 12.96 3.53
Equity investments, net -0.10 2.79 5.52 9.35 4.58 9.94 12.76 12.78 -0.55 14.33 16.46 6.96
Direct investment, net -0.26 -0.31 -0.43 -0.75 -1.65 -1.78 -2.34 -1.61 0.67 5.14 4.28 0.60
Portfolio investment, net 0.16 3.10 5.95 10.10 6.23 11.71 15.10 14.38 -1.22 9.19 12.18 6.36
Private creditors, net 3.85 5.07 2.55 -3.55 6.97 8.25 12.15 -26.34 -11.75 -4.23 -3.50 -3.43
Commercial banks, net -0.30 2.44 -1.47 -3.27 2.31 2.19 1.78 -18.12 0.74 1.22 -5.76 3.73
Nonbank, net 4.15 2.64 4.03 -0.28 4.66 6.06 10.37 -8.22 -12.48 -5.44 2.26 -7.16
Thailand
Private flows, net 10.32 11.50 10.09 10.96 12.87 21.86 19.54 -7.53 -14.87 -13.73 -10.57 -5.04
Equity investments, net 2.27 1.77 2.89 7.03 3.35 5.26 4.95 7.84 7.54 5.94 2.68 2.44
Direct investment, net 2.30 1.85 1.97 1.57 0.87 1.18 1.40 3.31 7.18 5.87 3.39 3.66
Portfolio investment, net -0.04 -0.08 0.92 5.46 2.48 4.08 3.54 4.53 0.36 0.07 -0.71 -1.22
Private creditors, net 8.05 9.74 7.19 3.94 9.52 16.60 14.59 -15.37 -22.41 -19.68 -13.25 -7.48
Commercial banks, net 1.03 0.21 1.86 3.32 13.27 10.48 5.65 -5.65 -15.24 -13.27 -6.99 -1.85
Nonbank, net 7.03 9.52 5.33 0.61 -3.75 6.12 8.94 -9.72 -7.17 -6.40 -6.26 -5.63
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Database (CD-Rom).
change reserves depleted rapidly from July until
November 1997, before improving in December, and
especially after the imposition of capital controls in
September 1998.
Massive portfolio capital inflows during the
early and mid-1990s had fundamentally transformed
the nature of Malaysia￿s capital market. While hold-
ing an estimated third of the stock of the largest6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 36
hundred companies comprising the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange (KLSE) Composite Index (KLCI),
foreign institutional investors moved the Malaysian
market. Malaysian institutions were generally too
small in comparison, while the larger Malaysian in-
stitutions generally took longer-term stock positions
and were less inclined to be involved in short-
termism and speculation, reflected in much more
active day-trading, for example. Needless to say,
￿retail￿ investors had little real influence on the
market, but generally exacerbated market volatility
by more speculative behaviour and greater tenden-
cies of following ￿ and thus exacerbating ￿ the
market￿s irrational exuberance or pessimism.
Much more global in outlook, foreign fund
managers were generally more inclined to consider
investing in Malaysia against alternative options else-
where in the world. Thus, they were probably key
to the phenomenon referred to as ￿contagion￿ in-
volving cross-border investment trends. As outsiders
operating with apparently limited information and
incentive packages encouraging conformism and
￿followership￿, especially in the face of uncertainty
and market downturns, they were also more likely to
contribute to ￿herd￿ behaviour. Hence, the Malaysian
stock market was the most vulnerable to both irra-
tional exuberance and pessimism among the four
most crisis-effected economies. Not surprisingly, the
KLCI fell most during the East Asian crisis despite
government interventions and the greater role of
government controlled investors in the stock mar-
ket who sought to limit and offset the downward slide
(see figure 1).
The magnitudes of gross inflows and outflows
reflect the much greater volatility of these flows,
often obscured by focusing on net flows. But even
the net flow data indicates the relative size of these
flows. A net sum of over RM30 billion of portfolio
investments flowed out in the last three quarters of
1997, much more than the total net inflows from
1995, and equivalent to almost a fifth of annual GNP.
This exodus included RM21.6 billion of shares and
corporate securities, and RM8.8 billion of money
market instruments. In just one quarter, from July to
September 1997, a net RM16 billion of portfolio
investments left the country.
Figure 1
AVERAGE STOCK PRICE INDEX IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THAILAND, 1997￿2003
(Local currency, June 1997 = 100)
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These differences have lent support to the claim
that Malaysia was an ￿innocent bystander￿ which
fell victim to regional contagion for being in the
wrong part of the world at the wrong time. Such a
view takes a benign perspective on portfolio invest-
ment inflows, and does not recognise that such
inflows are even more easily reversible and volatile
than bank loan inflows. Contrary to the ￿innocent
bystander￿ hypothesis, Malaysia￿s experience actu-
ally suggests the greater vulnerability of its heavier
reliance on the capital market. As a consequence,
the Malaysian economy became hostage to interna-
tional portfolio investor confidence. Hence, when
the government leadership engaged in rhetoric and
policy initiatives that upset such investor confidence,
Malaysia paid a heavy price as portfolio divestment
accelerated. The Malaysian stock market dropped
dramatically from almost 1,300 in February 1997 to
a low of 262 in early September 1998, eighteen
months later.
Policy response and deepening crisis
The resulting precipitous asset price collapses
￿ as the share and property market bubbles burst ￿
undermined Malaysia￿s heavily exposed banking
system for the second time in little over a decade,
causing economic recession. IMF prescriptions and
conventional policy-making wisdom urged govern-
ment spending cuts in the wake of the crisis.
Conventional policy making ￿wisdom￿ ￿ including
IMF prescriptions ￿ raised interest rates and other-
wise ￿tightened￿ monetary and fiscal policies (e.g.
by cutting government spending) in the wake of the
meltdown to further transform what had started as a
currency crisis into a full-blown financial crisis, then
into a crisis of the real economy as the Southeast
Asian region sharply went into recession in 1998.
It is worthwhile to emphasise at the outset that
Malaysia￿s experience differed from those of other
East Asian crisis-hit economies in at least four re-
spects. First, although prudential regulation had
deteriorated with financial liberalization, especially
since the mid-eighties, the situation in Malaysia had
been checked by the policy responses to the late
1980s￿ banking crisis. Hence, Malaysia was forced
by circumstances to become more cautious at a time
when the other crisis-effected East Asian economies
were pursuing international financial liberalization.
Second, although the Malaysian banking system had
contributed to asset price inflation, and was thus se-
verely affected by the crisis, Malaysian banks and
corporations had far less access to international bor-
rowing than their counterparts in other crisis-affected
economies. Unlike the others, foreign bank loans did
not figure as significantly in the Malaysian crisis,
whereas capital market flows, especially into and
out of the stock market, figured more prominently.
Third, as a consequence of its lower exposure to pri-
vate bank borrowings from abroad, Malaysia was
not in a situation of having to go cap in hand to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or to others for
emergency international credit facilities. Fourth, for
most of the second half of 1997, and again from mid-
1998, the Malaysian authorities deliberately pursued
unconventional measures in response to the deterio-
rating situation, with rather mixed results.
Hence, while there are important parallels be-
tween the Malaysian experience and those of its
crisis-affected neighbours, there are also important
differences. It is tempting to exaggerate the signifi-
cance of either similarities or contrasts to support
particular positions or arguments when, in fact, the
nature of the experiences do not allow strong analyti-
cal or policy conclusions to be drawn. For example,
whereas the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Indo-
nesia experienced positive growth in the first quarter
of 1999, Malaysian economic recovery only began
in the second quarter (see figure 2). Critics then were
very quick to blame Malaysia￿s unorthodox meas-
ures for its later recovery. Conversely, the Malaysian
regime has been equally quick to claim success for
its approach on the basis of limited evidence of
Malaysia￿s stronger recovery ￿ than Thailand and
Indonesia, though not the Republic of Korea ￿ in
1999 and 2000, which critics have just as readily
attributed variously to a technical rebound, the
pre-Y2K electronics boom and ￿unsustainable￿
government measures including large budget defi-
cits and massive government spending to compensate
for the shortfall of private investments.
The ringgit￿s collapse was initially portrayed
by the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir as being
exclusively due to speculative attacks on Southeast
Asian currencies. In a study published in mid-April
1998, the IMF acknowledged that currency specu-
lation precipitated the collapse of the baht, but de-
nied the role of currency speculation in the collapse
of the other East Asian currencies. While currency
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other currencies, contagion undoubtedly contributed
to the collapse of the other currencies in the region
not protected by the large reserves held by Japan,
China, Taiwan Province of China, Hong Kong (China)
and Singapore. Contagion ￿ exacerbated by the herd-
like panicky investment decisions of foreign portfo-
lio investors who perceived the region as much more
similar and integrated than it actually is (e.g. in terms
of trade or investment links, or even structural char-
acteristics) ￿ quickly snowballed to cause massive
capital flight.
As acknowledged by Mahathir, the ringgit prob-
ably fell much further than might otherwise have
been the case due to international market reactions
to his various contrarian statements, including his
tough speech in Hong Kong (China) on 20 Septem-
ber 1997, at a seminar before the Joint World Bank-
IMF annual meeting. Arguing that ￿currency trading
is unnecessary, unproductive and immoral￿, Mahathir
argued that it should be ￿stopped￿ and ￿made illegal￿.
Most damagingly, he seemed to threaten a uni-
lateral ban on foreign exchange purchases unrelated
to imports (which never materialized). Even before
his speech in Hong Kong (China), Mahathir had
railed against George Soros (calling him a ￿moron￿)
and international speculators for weeks, even sug-
gesting dark Western conspiracies to undermine the
East Asian achievement. Thus, Mahathir￿s remarks
continued to undermine confidence and to exacer-
bate the situation until he was finally reined in by
other government leaders in the region, and perhaps,
some of his cabinet colleagues and kitchen cabinet
advisers.
The Prime Minister￿s partly ￿ but not entirely
￿ ill-founded attacks reinforced the impression of
official ￿denial￿, with blame for the crisis attributed
abroad. The fact that there was some basis for his
rantings was hardly enough to salvage his reputa-
tion in the face of an increasingly hostile Western
media. Thus, until Soeharto￿s illness (December
1997) and subsequent recalcitrant behaviour (in the
eyes of the IMF and the international financial com-
munity) in 1998, Mahathir was demonised as the
regional ￿bad boy￿. Meanwhile, some other Gov-
ernments in the region had little choice but to go
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￿cap in hand￿ to the IMF and the United States and
Japanese Governments, in desperate efforts to re-
store confidence and secure funds to service their
fast-growing ￿non-performing￿ foreign debt liabili-
ties, although they were mainly privately-held.
Other official Malaysian policy responses did
not help. In late August 1997, the authorities desig-
nated the top one hundred indexed KLCI share
counters. Designation required actual presentation
of scrip at the moment of transaction (rather than
later, as had been the practice), ostensibly to check
￿short-selling￿, which was exacerbating the stock
market collapse. This ill-conceived measure ad-
versely affected liquidity, causing the stock market
to fall further.
The government￿s threat to use repressive meas-
ures against commentators making unfavourable
reports about the Malaysian economy strengthened
the impression that the government had a lot to hide
from public scrutiny. Anwar￿s mid-October 1997
announcement of the 1998 Malaysian Budget was
seen by ￿the market￿, i.e. mainly foreign financial
interests, as only the latest in a series of Malaysian
Government policy measures tantamount to ￿denial￿
of the gravity of the crisis and its possible causes.
A post-Cabinet meeting announcement, on 3 Sep-
tember 1997, of the creation of a special RM60 billion
fund for selected Malaysians was understandably
seen as a bail-out facility designed to save ￿cronies￿
from disaster. Although the fund was never prop-
erly institutionalised as announced, and government
officials later denied its existence, government-con-
trolled public funds, mainly from pension funds, the
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Petronas and
Khazanah, have been deployed to bail out some of
the most politically well-connected and influential,
including Mahathir￿s eldest son, the publicly-listed
corporation set up by his party cooperative (KUB)
and the country￿s largest conglomerate (Renong),
previously controlled by his party and believed to
be ultimately controlled by him and then Govern-
ment￿s Economic Adviser, Mahathir￿s confidante,
and later, second-time by Finance Minister Daim.
The protracted UEM-Renong saga (Group of Com-
panies) from mid-November 1997 was probably
most damaging. The nature of this ￿bail-out￿ ￿ to
the tune of RM2.34 billion ￿ gravely undermined
public confidence in the Malaysian investment en-
vironment as stock market rules were suspended at
the expense of minority shareholders￿ interests, with
the KLSE losing RM70 billion in market capitaliza-
tion over the next three days.
The situation was initially worsened by the
perception that Mahathir and Daim had taken over
economic policy making from Anwar, who had en-
deared himself over the years to the international
financial community. Daim￿s return to the frontline
of policy-making caused ambiguity about who was
really in charge from early to mid-1998, and about
what to expect. Some measures introduced by the
Finance Ministry and the central bank from early
December 1997 and in late March 1998 were also
perceived as pre-empting the likely role and impact
of Mahathir￿s National Economic Action Council
(NEAC).
The establishment of the NEAC had been an-
nounced in late 1997 to be chaired by the Prime
Minister, with Daim clearly in charge as executive
director. Daim was later appointed Minister with
Special Functions, operating from the Prime Minis-
ter￿s Department, in late June 1998 ￿ right after the
annual general assembly of the United Malays Na-
tional Organization (UMNO). He was subsequently
made First Finance Minister in late 1998, with his
protØgØ Mustapha Mohamad serving as Second
Finance Minister while retaining the Ministry of
Entrepreneurial Development portfolio.
The issue of IMF intervention in Malaysia has
become the subject of some exaggeration, as vari-
ous groups have rather different perceptions of the
IMF￿s actual record and motives. For many of those
critical of Malaysian Government policy (not just in
response to the crisis), IMF intervention was ex-
pected to put an end to all, or at least much, which
they considered wrong or wished to be rid off. In
the wake of the protracted wrangling between the
IMF and Soeharto￿s Government in Indonesia, this
pro-IMF lobby in Malaysia saw the IMF as the only
force capable of bringing about desired reforms
which domestic forces could not bring about on their
own.
Ironically, some of them failed to recognise that
the measures introduced from December 1997 were
akin to what the IMF would have liked to see. These
measures (White Paper, box 1: 25￿26) included:
￿ Bank Negara raising its three-month interven-
tion rate from 8.7 per cent at the end of 1997 to
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￿ drastic reductions in government expenditure; and
￿ redefining non-performing loans as loans in ar-
rears for three months, not six months as before.
Such contractionary measures helped transform
the financial crisis into a more general economic
crisis for the country.
Tighter monetary policy from late 1997 exac-
erbated deflationary pressures due to government
spending cuts from around the same time. Thus,
contractionary macroeconomic policy responses also
worsened the situation. Given the massive currency
devaluation in Malaysia￿s very open economy, the
rise of inflation at this time was virtually unavoid-
able, with little to be achieved by such tight macro-
economic policy (table 2). Of course, such policies
were also intended to stem the capital flight facili-
tated by the long-standing official commitment to
capital account convertibility. But again, there is lit-
tle evidence of success in conditions of contagion
and herd behaviour.
The Malaysian Government￿s White Paper on
the Status of the Malaysian Economy, issued on
6 April 1999, sums up many factors contributing to
the ongoing economic crisis as well as most policy
responses. However, it did so by whitewashing
Mahathir￿s and Daim￿s roles in worsening the cri-
sis, and instead implied that Anwar Ibrahim was
solely responsible for all domestic policy errors.
Conversely, Anwar is not credited with a second U-
turn by attempting to reflate the economy by fiscal
means from May 1998 and for establishing the key
institutions for financial restructuring and recovery
such as Danaharta, Danamodal and the Corporate
Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC). However,
the White Paper did show how foreign investments
were selectively encouraged to protect and save in-
terests the regime favoured, including those who had
contributed to causing the crisis. In any case, its ten-
dentious account of recent developments then still
fresh in the minds of most readers not only contra-
dicted some facts, but was also unlikely to inspire
the investor confidence so badly needed to ensure
economic recovery. Subsequent abuses of the debt
workout process further undermined its integrity and
the overall credibility of the recovery strategy.
At the time, most observers still remembered
that Mahathir￿s KLCI ￿designation￿ ruling had dras-
tically reduced liquidity in the stock market,
precipitating a sharp collapse in late August 1997
and necessitating its cancellation a week later. Simi-
larly, the UEM reverse take-over to bail out Renong
in mid-November 1997, apparently supported by
Mahathir and Daim, had resulted in a 20 per cent
stock market contraction of RM70 billion in three
days! Mahathir￿s rhetoric about various western con-
spiracies against Malaysia and the region further
undermined international confidence and the value
of the Malaysian ringgit.
The gravity of the crisis and the difficulties of
recovery were clearly exacerbated by injudicious
policy responses, compromised by nepotism and
other types of cronyism, though there is little evi-
dence that cronyism, in itself, led to or precipitated
the crisis in early 1998. All this transformed the in-
evitable ￿correction￿ of the overvalued ringgit into
a collapse of both the ringgit and the Kuala Lumpur
stock market as panic set in, amplified by ￿herd￿
behaviour and ￿contagion￿. Government efforts to
￿bail-out￿ politically influential business interests
and to otherwise protect or advance such interests ￿
usually at the expense of the public (the public purse,
Table 2
INFLATION IN MALAYSIA, INDONESIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND
THAILAND, 1991￿2002
(Per cent change of consumer
price index over previous year)
Rep. of
Malaysia Indonesia Korea Thailand
1991 4.4 9.4 9.4 5.7
1992 4.8 7.5 6.2 4.1
1993 3.6 9.7 4.8 3.3
1994 4.9 8.5 6.3 5.1
1995 4.1 9.4 4.4 5.8
1996 3.5 8.0 4.9 5.8
1997 2.7 6.2 4.4 5.6
1998 5.3 58.5 7.5 8.1
1999 2.7 20.5 0.8 0.3
2000 1.4 3.7 2.3 1.5
2001 1.4 11.5 4.3 1.7
2002 1.8 11.9 2.8 0.6
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workers forced savings, taxpayers or minority share-
holders) ￿ exacerbated the crisis by undermining
public and foreign confidence.
Thus, fourteen months after the East Asian cur-
rency and financial crises began with the floating of
the Thai baht in July 1997, Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad introduced several controver-
sial currency and capital control measures. In the
last quarter of 1998, the regional turmoil came to an
end as East Asian currencies strengthened and sta-
bilized after the Federal Reserve lowered interest
rates. In the first quarter of 1999, Thailand, Indone-
sia and the Republic of Korea posted positive growth
rates, while Malaysia￿s recession went into its fifth
quarter. However, by the end of 1999, of the four,
Malaysia￿s recovery was second only to that of the
Republic of Korea, with their stronger recoveries
continuing into 2000 (see figure 2).
The September 1998 package
The measures introduced on 1 September 1998
were designed to (Rajaraman, 2003):
￿ Kill the offshore ringgit market, by prohibiting
the transfer of funds into the country from ex-
ternally held ringgit accounts except for invest-
ment in Malaysia (excluding credit to residents),
or for the purchase of goods in Malaysia. The
offshore ringgit market could only function
with externally held ringgit accounts in corre-
spondent banks in Malaysia. Thus, offshore
ringgit deposits could no longer be used for this
purpose. Offshore banks required freely usable
access to onshore ringgit bank accounts to
match their ringgit liabilities, which the new
ruling prohibited. Holders of offshore deposits
were given the month of September 1998 to
repatriate their deposits to Malaysia. This elimi-
nated the major source of ringgit for specula-
tive buying of dollars in anticipation of a ringgit
crash. Large-denomination ringgit notes were
later demonetised to make the circulation of the
ringgit currency outside Malaysia more diffi-
cult.
￿ Close off access by non-residents to domestic
ringgit sources by prohibiting ringgit credit
facilities to them. All trade transactions now
had to be settled in foreign currencies, and only
authorised depository institutions were allowed
to handle transactions in ringgit financial assets.
￿ Shut down the offshore market in Malaysian
shares conducted through the Central Limit
Order Book (CLOB) in Singapore.
￿ Obstruct speculative outward capital flows by
requiring prior approval for Malaysian residents
to invest abroad in any form, and limiting ex-
ports of foreign currency by residents for other
than valid current account purposes.
￿ Protect the ringgit￿s value and raise foreign ex-
change reserves by requiring repatriation of
export proceeds within six months from the
time of export.
￿ Further insulate monetary policy from the for-
eign exchange market by imposing a 12-month
ban on outflow of external portfolio capital
(only on the principal; interest and dividend
payments could be freely repatriated).
Malaysia had so free a capital account regime
leading up to the 1997 crisis, that there was even an
offshore market in ringgit, perhaps the only case of
an offshore market in an emerging market currency￿
(Rajaraman, 2003). Rajaraman (2003) argues that
the offshore ringgit market developed, mainly in
Singapore, because of the absence of a domestic
market for hedging instruments. The offshore ringgit
market developed in response to non-residents￿ de-
mand for hedging instruments when import and
export settlements were still ringgit-denominated to
exempt Malaysian based importers and exporters
from the need to hedge. With imports and exports
now dollar-denominated as part of the package of
exchange control measures of September 1998,
developing such a domestic market for hedging
instruments has been postponed indefinitely. How-
ever, she insists that such markets will have to be
developed over the long term as there will eventu-
ally be a need for hedging instruments once the peg
is abandoned.
This offshore ringgit market then facilitated
exchange rate turbulence in 1997￿98. Recognizing
this, the September 1998 measures sought to elimi-
nate the offshore market, and to insulate domestic
monetary policy from the foreign exchange market
during the crisis, in order to lower interest rates.12 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 36
Although several factors contributed to the rise in
ringgit interest rates from the second half of 1997,
the offshore ringgit market facilitated speculative
offshore borrowing of ringgit to finance dollar pur-
chases in anticipation of a crash in the ringgit￿s value.
High interest rates had devastating consequences for
the real economy and its banking institutions, already
overexposed to share and property lending.
The policy package is generally recognised as
comprehensive and cleverly designed to limit for-
eign exchange outflows and ringgit speculation by
non-residents as well as residents, while not ad-
versely affecting foreign direct investors.1 The meas-
ures were also effectively enforced by the Central
Bank. In so far as the package was successful, this
has often been attributed to Malaysian conditions,
particularly the adequacy of its foreign exchange
reserves, its lower exposure to foreign debt and
strong economic fundamentals.
However, the impact of the package can only
be assessed with respect to a Malaysian counterfac-
tual, since the various countries differed in terms of
their vulnerability to the crisis. The Malaysian re-
covery in 1999 was weaker than that of the Republic
of Korea but stronger than those of Thailand and, of
course, Indonesia. The speed of turnaround in the
Malaysian economy ￿ from -10.6 per cent in the sec-
ond half of 1998 to -1.5 per cent in the first quarter
of 1999, and positive growth in all the following
quarters ￿ was undoubtedly impressive, but not re-
ally better than the other East Asian crisis economies,
all of which registered positive growth from the first
quarter of 1999 (see figure 2).
However, it is likely that the reduction in inter-
est rates helped contain the increase in NPLs in the
banking system. Standard and Poor estimated that
NPLs would have risen to 30 per cent if interest rates
had not fallen as sharply as they did. Also, the Fed-
eration of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) noted
that the exchange rate peg and reduced interest rates
lowered corporate uncertainty and made business
planning easier (IMF, 1999; Rajaraman, 2003), but
again, the comparison is with the previous period,
rather than trends in the other crisis economies,
where exchange rate volatility and interest rates also
eased from the last quarter of 1998.
The benchmark for setting the ceiling on the
base lending rate (BLR) of banks ￿ previously the
3-month inter-bank rate2 ￿ was changed to the Bank
Negara Malaysia (BNM) intervention rate (with the
same formula as before), to enhance BNM leverage
over lending rates, with the permissible margin above
the benchmark reduced (by 10 per cent) from 2.5 to
2.25 percentage points. The cap on the maximum
lending rate was also reduced for the first time since
financial deregulation began from a spread of 4 per
cent above the BLR, to 2.5 per cent (Rajaraman,
2003: table 13). The average lending rate fell from
11.5 per cent at the end of 1997 to 9.7 per cent at the
end of 1998, while the one-year real deposit rate fell
from 6.6 per cent to 0.4 per cent over the same year.
As inflation subsequently declined from the 1998
peak of 5.3 per cent, real interest rates rose, though
nominal rates remained low.
The September 1998 measures imposed a
12-month waiting period for repatriation of invest-
ment proceeds from the liquidation of external portfolio
investments. To pre-empt a large-scale outflow at the
end of the 12 month period in September 1999 and
to try to attract new portfolio investments from
abroad, a system of graduated exit levies was intro-
duced from 15 February 1999, with different rules
for capital already in the country and for capital
brought in after that date. For capital already in the
country, there was an exit tax inversely proportional
to the duration of stay within the earlier stipulated
period of 12 months. Capital that had entered the
country before 15 February 1998 was free to leave
without paying any exit tax. For new capital yet to
come in, the levy would only be imposed on profits,
defined to exclude dividends and interest, also gradu-
ated by length of stay. In effect, profits were being
defined by the new rules as realised capital gains.
As a levy applicable only at the time of con-
version of ringgit proceeds into foreign exchange,
and hence not a capital gains tax, it could not be
offset through double taxation agreements. The 10
per cent levy on profits, even on funds invested for
over 12 months, was seen as generally discouraging
portfolio inflows, and even equity investments in
particular, since interest and dividends were ex-
empted. The higher levy of 30 per cent on gains from
investments of less than a year, attracted especially
heavy criticism on the grounds that potential inves-
tors would apply the higher levy rate of 30 per cent
to all investments regardless of actual maturity peri-
ods because of the ￿last in, first out￿ rule (IMF, 1999).
On 21 September 1999, the higher levy was elimi-
nated, leaving only a single rate of 10 per cent on
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which eliminated the incentive to invest longer in
Malaysia. The 10 per cent levy on capital gains re-
patriated after investing in Malaysia for more than
one year was removed from 1 January 2001.
Rajaraman (2003) has argued that ￿The very
criticism directed at the new package helped iden-
tify what was good about it, and more importantly,
underlined why it could prove of enduring worth in
reducing volatility in capital flows. It is true that the
levy reduced the expected rate of return on equity to
foreign investors, and thus raised the required pre-
levy rate of return needed relative to other markets.
This was an intended effort to reduce casual entry
into Malaysia, and to ensure that capital would
enter only when the fundamentals justified the
expectation of a higher pre-levy rate of return￿. How-
ever, her argument does not seem to recognise that
the new arrangements would not serve as an effec-
tive deterrent to capital flight in the event of panic.
With the levy only imposed on profits, investors will
not be disinclined to withdraw their funds from
Malaysia in the event of a stock market downturn or
anticipation of one, which would then become a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
Credit facilities for share as well as property
purchases were actually increased as part of the pack-
age. The government has even encouraged its
employees to take second mortgages for additional
property purchases at its heavily discounted interest
rate. Although otherwise appreciative of Malaysian
measures, including the role of the central bank,
Rajaraman (2003) notes that the property sector
￿continues to account for 40 per cent of NPLs￿, and
that the controls introduced ￿in 1999 to prohibit lend-
ing for construction of high-end properties came five
years too late to avert the financial sector softening
that was a contributory, if not the precipitating, fac-
tor in the 1997 crisis. Controls on connected lending,
now in place, again came five years too late￿. Ringgit
credit facilities by residents to non-residents are also
allowed for up to RM200,000, well below the ear-
lier pre-1998 limit of RM5 million, though not to
purchase immovable property in Malaysia.
The offshore ringgit market was wiped out by
the September 1998 measures. The exchange con-
trols, still in place, limit access to ringgit for
non-residents, preventing the re-emergence of an
offshore ringgit market. Free movement from ringgit
to dollars for residents is possible, but dollars must
be held in foreign exchange accounts in Malaysia,
e.g. at the officially approved foreign currency off-
shore banking centre on Labuan.
For effective control of the capital account,
Rajaraman (2003) maintains that it is sufficient that
the foreign exchange accounts are held by banking
institutions under the central bank￿s regulatory au-
thority since export of dollars outside the country is
not otherwise allowed. Outward portfolio flows ￿
whether from ￿corporates￿ or resident individuals ￿
require approval, which is rarely granted, though
portfolio inflows are still being encouraged by the
Malaysian authorities. By late 1999, international
rating agencies had begun restoring Malaysia￿s credit
rating, e.g. the Malaysian market was re-inserted on
the Morgan Stanley Capital International Indices in
May 2000. But as in Chile, the barriers can be low-
ered over time without a formal change of regime.
Malaysia may need to adopt a more flexible
exchange rate policy adaptable to its monetary policy
requirements. The dollar peg has alternatively been
estimated to have either overvalued or undervalued
the ringgit, depending on the strength of the green-
back. It was claimed that higher import prices with
an undervalued ringgit had led to lower investments
than would otherwise have been the case with a float-
ing ringgit. However, the lower investment rate since
1998 has continued despite the weaker dollar ￿ and
ringgit ￿ since 2001.
Did Malaysia￿s 1998 controls succeed?
Malaysia￿s bold measures of 1￿2 September
1998 received very mixed receptions. There has been
a tendency since for both sides in the debate over
Malaysia￿s capital control measures to exaggerate
their own cases, with little regard for what actually
happened. Initially, market fundamentalists loudly
prophesied doom for Malaysia, and after Malaysia
recovered more strongly than Thailand and Indone-
sia, only second to the Republic of Korea, the
criticisms have shifted ground, always predicting that
the economic chickens must inevitably come home
to roost. Besides the chequered record of the
Malaysian recovery, there are clearly also compli-
cations of attributing causation. Both sides often
forget that capital controls are often necessary means
to other policy objectives, rather than ends in and of
themselves.14 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 36
Proponents of capital account liberalization
generally opposed them as a setback to the growing
capital account liberalization of the previous two
decades. For them, the measures undermined freer
capital movements and capital market efficiency ￿
including net flows from the capital rich to the capi-
tal poor, cheaper funds, reduced volatility, lower
inflation and higher growth ￿ besides encouraging a
reversal of the larger trends towards greater eco-
nomic liberalization and globalization. Doctrinaire
neo-liberals also disagree with the IMF￿s interven-
tionism, albeit minimalist, while counter-cyclical
interventionists condemned the IMF￿s early pro-
cyclicality. The Fund￿s own policy stance has also
changed over time. Most ￿ though not all ￿ heterodox
economists have endorsed the Malaysian challenge
to contemporary orthodoxy for the converse reasons,
emphasizing that financial ￿ including capital account
￿ liberalization has exacerbated financial system vul-
nerability and macroeconomic volatility.
More importantly, they emphasize that such
measures create the conditions for restoring the
monetary policy autonomy, considered necessary for
engendering economic recovery. Many intermedi-
ate positions have also emerged, e.g. the IMF￿s then
Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer endorsed
Chilean-style controls on capital inflows, implying
that the September 1998 Malaysian controls on out-
flows were far less acceptable, ostensibly because
of their greater adverse consequences.
The Malaysian experience suggests that the
orthodoxy￿s predictions of disaster (e.g. by the late
Nobel Laureate Merton Miller, among others) were
simply not borne out by events. However, it is much
more difficult to prove that the Malaysian controls
were the resounding success claimed by its propo-
nents. After all, the regional currency turmoil came
to an end throughout the region by the last quarter
of 1998, probably thanks mainly to United States
lower interest rates (strengthening East Asian cur-
rencies) after the regional crisis seemed to be
spreading dangerously westward, with the August
1998 Russian crisis and its subsequent reverberations
on Wall Street. However, proponents of reflationary
measures generally agree that fiscal measures tend
to be far more effective than monetary policies in
this regard.
The actual efficacy of the Malaysian measures
is difficult to assess. Supporters of the Malaysian
measures emphasize that Malaysia recovered more
strongly in 1999 and 2000 than neighbouring Thai-
land and Indonesia, both which were subjected to
onerous IMF programmes. However, Malaysia￿s 6.3
per cent recovery in 1999 was more modest than the
10.7 per cent achieved in the Republic of Korea. It
seems likely that the stronger recoveries in Malay-
sia and the Republic of Korea can be attributed to
stronger fiscal reflationary efforts as well as in-
creased electronics demand (probably in anticipation
of the Y2K problem come the year 2000).
Since the Republic of Korea was also subject
to an IMF programme, one cannot attribute the dif-
ferent rates of recovery in 1999 to different mon-
etary policy measures or IMF conditionality at this
stage. Before that, Thai interest rates ￿ long well
above Malaysian levels ￿ fell below Malaysian rates
after September 1998, after being well above the
Malaysian rates for years (Jomo, ed., 2001: 206, fig-
ure 7.1). This suggests that the United States Fed￿s
lowering of interest rates did more to reduce inter-
est rates in the East Asian region than the Septem-
ber 1998 Malaysian initiatives did. However, this is
also consistent with the general observation that
monetary policy is far less effective than fiscal meas-
ures in reflating the economy.
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir￿s Septem-
ber 1998 capital controls were correctly seen as a
bold rejection of both market orthodoxy as well as
IMF market-friendly neo-liberalism. Whereas Thai-
land, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia had gone
cap in hand ￿ humiliatingly accepting IMF imposed
conditions ￿ to secure desperately needed credit, the
Malaysian initiative reminded the world that there
are alternatives to capital account liberalization. For
many, enthusiastic support for the Malaysian con-
trols and claims of its success are crucial in the
opposition to market fundamentalism as well as Fund
neo-liberalism.
The capital control measures were significantly
revised in February 1999. The modifications recog-
nised some problematic consequences of the capital
controls regime, and represented attempts to miti-
gate them. As of 1 September 1999, the September
1998 regime was fundamentally transformed with
the end of the original curbs on capital outflows.
There have since been no new curbs on inflows, but
rather, strenuous efforts to encourage the return of
capital inflows, including short-term capital.
Neo-liberal critics have claimed that the re-
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1996 have been due to the reduced credibility of the
Malaysian authorities after its imposition of the Sep-
tember 1998 controls. However, there is considerable
evidence of a decline of FDI throughout Southeast
Asia, including those countries that did not close their
capital accounts. The more plausible argument would
be that the 1997￿98 crises drew dramatic attention
to Southeast Asia￿s declining competitiveness and
attractiveness, compared to, say, China.
Meanwhile, many opponents of capital account
liberalization have gone to the other extreme, with
some wishful exaggeration about what the Malaysian
measures actually implied and achieved. For exam-
ple, one supporter has extolled the controls￿
ostensibly virtuous consequences for labour with
scant regard for the Malaysian authorities￿ self-con-
fessed motive of saving big business interests,
ostensibly in order to protect jobs for workers. The
desirability of some measures is also in doubt as
evidence mounts of favouritism or ￿cronyism￿ in
their implementation (Johnson and Mitton, 2001) and
the dubious contribution of ￿rescued￿ interests to
national economic recovery efforts (Tan, 2002;
Wong, 2002).
So, did Malaysia￿s September 1998 selective
capital control measures succeed? The merits and
demerits of the Malaysian Government￿s regime of
capital controls to deal with the regional currency
and financial crises will continue to be debated for a
long time to come as the data does not lend itself to
clearly supporting any particular position. Propo-
nents can claim that the economic decline came to a
stop soon after, and the stock market slide turned
around, while opponents can say that such reversals
have been more pronounced in the rest of the region
(see figure 1).
Industrial output, especially for manufacturing,
declined even faster after the introduction of capital
controls in Malaysia until November 1998, and con-
tinued downward in January 1999 before turning
around. Except for a few sectors (notably electron-
ics), industrial output recovery has not been spec-
tacular since then, except in comparison with the
deep recession in the year before. Unemployment
rose especially in construction and financial serv-
ices, but less dramatically than in other crisis-affected
countries (see table 3). Domestic investment pro-
posals were almost halved, while ￿greenfield￿ FDI
seems to have declined by much less, though cynics
claim actual trends were obscured by faster process-
ing of applications as well as subsequent reconsid-
eration and approval of previously rejected applica-
tions (Jomo, ed., 2001: figure 7.2).
As is generally recognized, the one-year lock-
in of foreign funds in the country was too late to
avert the crisis, or to lock in the bulk of foreign funds
that had already fled the country. Instead, the funds
￿trapped￿ were those that had not already left in the
preceding 14 months, ironically and inadvertently
￿punishing￿ those investors who had not already
taken their funds out of Malaysia.
It appears that, at best, the capital controls￿ ac-
tual contribution to the strong recovery in 1999￿2000
was ambiguous. At worst, it may have slowed down
the recovery led by fiscal counter-cyclical measures
and the extraordinary demand for electronics, thus
explaining the weaker recovery in Malaysia com-
pared to the Republic of Korea. In the longer term,
some critics claim that it diminished the likely
recovery of foreign direct investment ￿ which com-
pelled the authorities to seek more domestic sources
of economic growth ￿ though the evidence for this
is ambiguous as the entire region has experienced
Table 3
UNEMPLOYMENT IN MALAYSIA, INDONESIA,




Malaysia Indonesia Korea Thailand
1990 5.1 2.5 2.5 2.2
1991 4.3 2.6 2.3 2.7
1992 3.7 2.7 2.4 1.4
1993 3.0 2.8 2.8 1.5
1994 2.9 4.4 2.4 1.3
1995 2.8 7.2 2.0 1.1
1996 2.5 4.9 2.0 1.1
1997 2.6 4.7 2.6 0.9
1998 3.2 5.5 6.8 4.4
1999 3.4 6.4 6.3 4.2
2000 3.1 6.1 4.1 3.6
2001 3.7 8.1 3.7 3.3
2002 3.5 . 3.0 2.4
Source: Asian Development Bank, ARIC Indicators.16 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 36
diminished FDI post-crisis. More importantly, the
regime remains untested in checking international
currency volatility, as such instability abated through-
out the region at around the same time, due to the
United States Fed￿s lowering of interest rates. Al-
though recovery of the Malaysian share market,
which had declined much more than other stock
markets during the crisis, lagged behind the other
(relatively smaller) markets in the region, not too
much should be made of this.
Malaysia was fortunate in the timing of the
imposition of capital controls if, indeed, as stated
by Mahathir in his speech to the symposium on the
first anniversary of the controls, it came about al-
most in desperation. At the time it was introduced,
the external environment was about to change sig-
nificantly, while the economy had seen the outflow
of the bulk of short-term capital, so that in a very
real sense, the regime was never tested. If the tur-
moil of the preceding months had continued until
the end of 1998, or beyond, continued shifts and re-
pegging would have been necessary, with consequent
deleterious effects.
Clearly, the ringgit peg brought a welcome res-
pite to businessmen after over a year of currency
volatility. But, as noted earlier, exchange rate vola-
tility across the region also effectively abated shortly
thereafter, with the later Brazilian and other crises
not renewing such volatility in the region. Moreover,
it is ironic that an ostensibly nationalistic attempt to
defend monetary independence against currency
speculators should, in effect, hand over determina-
tion of the ringgit￿s value to the United States Federal
Reserve with the dollar peg.
If the dollar had strengthened significantly
against other currencies, Malaysia may have had to
re-peg against the dollar to retain export com-
petitiveness. In the event, the greenback initially
weakened due to the lowered interest rates. After
strengthening from 1999, it has weakened again since
2001, which has put much less pressure for re-peg-
ging or de-pegging. For reasons which are not
entirely clear, there does not seem to be any inclina-
tion for the Mahathir Government to get off the peg,
though it is unclear how long the peg will last after
he retires in October 2003.
While interest rates were undoubtedly thus
brought down by Government decree in Malaysia,
the desired effects were limited. Interest rates came
down dramatically across the region, in some cases,
even more than in Malaysia, without others having
to resort to capital controls. For example, while in-
terest rates in Thailand were much higher than in
Malaysia for over a year after the crisis began, they
declined below Malaysian levels during September
1998 (Jomo, ed., 2001: figure 7.1).
Perhaps more importantly, loan and money sup-
ply growth rates actually declined in the first few
months after the new measures were introduced de-
spite central bank threats to sack bank managers who
failed to achieve the 8 per cent loan growth target
rate for 1998. It has become clear that credit expan-
sion has been a consequence of factors other than
capital controls or even low interest rates. Across
the region, especially in the Republic of Korea and
Thailand, counter-cyclical spending also grew, again
without resorting to capital controls.
The Malaysian authorities￿ mid-February 1999
measures effectively abandoned the main capital
control measure introduced in September 1998, i.e.
the one-year lock-in. While foreign investors were
prohibited from withdrawing funds from Malaysia
before September 1999, they were allowed to with-
draw from mid-February 1999 after paying a scaled
exit tax (pay less for keeping longer in Malaysia), in
the hope that this would reduce the rush for the gates
come September 1999. Meanwhile, in an attempt to
attract new capital inflows, new investors would only
be liable for a less onerous tax on capital gains.
As noted earlier, it is unlikely that the capital
gains tax effective from February 1999 will actually
deter exit in the event of panic as investors rush to
get out to cut their losses. At best, however, it served
to discourage some kinds of short-selling from
abroad owing to the much higher capital gains tax
rate on withdrawals within less than a year of 30 per
cent, as opposed to 10 per cent. The differential capi-
tal gains exit tax rate may have discouraged some
short-selling from abroad, but did little to address
other possible sources of vulnerability and, as em-
phasized above, would not have deterred capital
flight in the event of financial panic. In September
1999, the capital gains exit tax rate was set a uni-
form 10 per cent, thus eliminating the only feature
of the February 1999 revised controls that might have
deterred short-selling from abroad.
Effectively, Malaysia remains virtually de-
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event of a sudden exodus of portfolio capital in fu-
ture. Admittedly, however, this is not the most urgent
problem for the time being, in light of the limited
international interest in Malaysia￿s capital market.
In mid-1994, as the rising stock market renewed for-
eign portfolio investors￿ interest in the Malaysian
market, those who stood to gain from a stock mar-
ket bubble successfully lobbied for the early 1994
controls on portfolio capital inflows to be abandoned.
This reversal later rendered Malaysia vulnerable to
the flight of portfolio capital of 1997￿98, reflected
in the stock market collapse by about four-fifths.
By setting the peg at RM3.8 to the dollar on
2 September 1998, after it had been trading in the
range of RM4 ￿ 4.2 per dollar, the Malaysian au-
thorities were then seeking to raise the value of the
ringgit. In mid-September 1998, however, the other
currencies in the region strengthened after the United
States Federal Reserve lowered interest rates in the
aftermath of the Russian Federation and LTCM cri-
ses, strengthening the yen and other regional
currencies. Thus, the ringgit became undervalued for
about a year thereafter, which ￿ by chance rather
than by design ￿ boosted Malaysian foreign ex-
change reserves from the trade surplus, largely due
to import compression, as well as some exchange
rate-sensitive exports. Malaysia￿s foreign exchange
reserves depleted rapidly from July until November
1997, before improving in December, and then, es-
pecially after the imposition of capital controls in
September 1998 (Jomo, ed., 2001: figure 5.10). Thus,
the ringgit undervaluation may have helped the
Malaysian economic recovery, but certainly not in
the way the authorities intended when pegging the
ringgit in September 1998.
While the undervalued ringgit may have fa-
voured an export-led recovery strategy in 1998￿99
and since 2001, this certainly was not the intent.
(Then, as now, government efforts have been focused
on a domestic-led recovery strategy.) The under-
valued ringgit is said to have had a (unintended)
￿beggar-thy-neighbour￿ effect. Due to trade com-
petition, the undervalued ringgit is said to have
discouraged other regional currencies from strength-
ening earlier for fear of becoming relatively uncom-
petitive with regards to Malaysian production costs
and exports, though the evidence for this claim re-
mains unclear. There were also fears that the weak
Southeast Asian currencies might cause China￿s au-
thorities to devalue the renminbi, which could have
had the undesirable effect of triggering off another
round of ￿competitive devaluations￿, with concomi-
tant dangers for all.
The low volume of actual capital outflows since
the end of the lock-in on 1 September 1999 has been
interpreted in different ways. One view was that since
the stock market had recovered and could be ex-
pected to continue to rise, there was little reason to
flee. A second view emphasized the role of the nomi-
nal exchange rate, which has been fixed against the
dollar at RM3.8. With the greenback perceived to
be still strengthening then, there was little exchange
rate risk to discourage investors from holding ringgit.
A third perspective suggested that the capital con-
trols were probably unnecessary, having been
introduced 14 months after the crisis began, i.e. af-
ter most of the capital flight had already taken place.
Taking the Rajaraman (2003) argument further,
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) have argued that the con-
trols averted another crisis that had yet to hit
Malaysia. They note that the offshore overnight
ringgit market (principally in Singapore) interest
rates had remained at high levels (around 40 per cent)
for some months, putting tremendous upward pres-
sure on domestic interest rates. A leading Malaysian
neo-liberal economist, Thillainathan has disputed this
assertion, claiming a very thin, and mainly specula-
tive offshore market despite the huge amount of
ringgit held abroad (reputedly RM25￿30 billion).
The significance of these conflicting claims can ul-
timately only be settled empirically.3
Conclusions and policy lessons
What lessons can be drawn from Malaysia￿s
1998 capital controls? Most importantly, the preced-
ing examination of the circumstances preceding the
introduction of the controls as well as the specific
nature of the controls and their apparent consequences
suggest caution in making gross generalizations.
Instead, the experience urges greater attention to
context and detail.
Capital controls did not cause the recovery in
Malaysia to be slower than in the other crisis coun-
tries. The 1998 collapse was less deep in Malaysia
than in Thailand and Indonesia, while the recovery
in Malaysia has been faster after early 1999. Of
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serious to begin with owing to strengthened pruden-
tial regulations after the late 1980s￿ banking crisis
(when non-performing loans went up to 30 per cent
of total loans). There were strict controls on Malaysian
private borrowing from abroad with borrowers
generally required to demonstrate likely foreign
exchange earnings from the proposed investments
to be financed with foreign credit. Hence, although
Malaysia seemingly has the most open economy in
the region after Hong Kong (China) and Singapore,
with the total value of its international trade around
double annual national income, its foreign borrow-
ings and share of short-term loans in total credit were
far less than the more closed economies of the Re-
public of Korea, Indonesia and Thailand.
The coincidentally simultaneous timing of Paul
Krugman￿s Fortune article advocating capital con-
trols reinforced the impression that the measures
were primarily intended to provide monetary policy
independence to reflate the economy. However, as
noted earlier, foreign developments from August
1998 also created new international monetary con-
ditions that facilitated the adoption of reflationary
policies in the rest of the region. Though Malaysia
missed out on most of the renewed capital flows to
the region from the last quarter of 1998, it is not
clear that such easily reversible capital inflows are
all that desirable. The more serious problem has been
the future credibility of government policies, which
many critics claim has adversely affected foreign
direct investment into the country (despite official
protestations to the contrary) as well as risk premi-
ums for Malaysian bonds.
It is clear that while the Malaysian authorities
had long claimed full capital account liberalization,
there were in fact quite a number of important con-
straints preceding the 1994 and 1998 regulations.
This suggests that while a country may declare hav-
ing an open capital account, it is possible to have
enabling legislation and administrative regulations
that will qualify such openness in important ways
that may well serve macroeconomic management
and developmental governance. Such options may
well be the most relevant options for most develop-
ing economies today when there is a great deal of
pressure to maintain open capital accounts.
Only a few large countries enjoying greater
degrees of policy autonomy for various historical
and political reasons ￿ such as China and India ￿ are
able to effectively withstand such pressures. In any
case, many of the old measures for managing closed
capital accounts may no longer be effective, appro-
priate or desirable in contemporary circumstances.
This does not mean that countries should surrender
whatever remaining sovereignty they may enjoy and
instead opt for opening capital accounts, but rather
that far more attention should be given to substance
over form, to actual capabilities rather than formali-
ties, etc.
This seems especially crucial since the IMF
Interim Committee has already agreed to amending
its Articles of Agreement to extend jurisdiction from
the current account to the capital account. Many
modern capital account management tools qualify
capital account openness, rather than close capital
accounts altogether. This is especially true of so-
called ￿market-friendly￿ instruments, although it is
important not to insist on ￿market-friendliness￿, es-
pecially since counter-cyclical instruments are often
especially needed to ensure macroeconomic pru-
dence, which is usually the best way to conceptualise
and legitimise such measures.
This suggests that the Malaysian authorities
were right to limit exposure to foreign bank borrow-
ings while their neighbours in East Asia allowed,
facilitated and even encouraged such capital inflows
from the late 1980s. It is also important to stress that
the vulnerability of the other East Asian economies
to such borrowings was not merely due to the greed
of financial interests for arbitrage and other related
opportunities, or of corporate interests seeking
cheaper and easier credit. Regulations of Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) greatly encouraged
short-term lending and even European and Japanese
banks generally preferred dollar-denominated lend-
ing over other alternatives. In other words, criticism
of ￿bad lending￿ to East Asia before the crisis should
not only focus on the borrowers and domestic regu-
lations, but also on the lenders and the rules
regulating international lending.
The Malaysian experience also rejects the claim
that the East Asian crisis was due to foreign bank
borrowings, which could have been avoided by
greater reliance on the capital market, especially
stock markets. While capital flows to stock markets
undoubtedly have different implications than foreign
bank lending, such portfolio capital flows are even
more easily reversible than short-term foreign loans,
contrary to the claims by their advocates. Malaysian
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due to foreign borrowings, but instead to their ex-
tensive lending for stock market investments and
property purchases, as well as their reliance on shares
and real assets for loan collateral.
While there is no evidence that portfolio capi-
tal inflows significantly contributed to productive
investments or economic growth, the reversal of such
flows proved to be disruptive, exacerbating volatil-
ity. Their impact has been largely due to the ￿wealth
effect￿ and its consequences for consumption and,
eventually, investment. When these reversals were
large and sustained, they contributed to significant
disruption, if not disaster. The disruptive effect has
been exacerbated by the fact that portfolio capital
inflows tend to build up slowly, while outflows tend
to be larger and sudden.
Such outflows from late 1993 resulted in a
massive collapse of the Malaysian capital market and
the introduction of controls on inflows to discour-
age yet another build-up of such potentially
disruptive inflows. However, these were withdrawn
after half a year after successful lobbying by those
interests desiring yet another foreign portfolio capi-
tal-induced stock market bubble. It is likely that if
the early 1994 controls had not been withdrawn, the
massive build-up in 1995￿96 would not occurred and
Malaysia would consequently have been far less
vulnerable to the sudden and massive capital flight
in the year from July 1997.
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) argue that the Sep-
tember 1998 controls sought to avert yet another
crisis in the making. They suggest that the Singa-
pore-centred overseas ringgit market was putting
increasingly unbearable pressure on the Malaysian
monetary authorities, reflected in the very high over-
night interest rate for the ringgit in Singapore. The
September 1998 currency control measures clearly
sought to and succeeded in defusing this pressure.
While this analysis has been disputed by those who
claim the market was too thin to be as significant (as
suggested by Kaplan and Rodrik), the debate is un-
likely to be settled without reference to details of
the actual situation. However, their analysis points
to the desirability of not allowing national currency
reserves to build up abroad. Japan and Singapore
have long resisted such internationalization of their
currencies.
After over a year of considerable international
monetary instability, the East Asian crisis was said
to be spreading with the Russian crisis in August
1998. This, in turn, contributed to the collapse of
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). In decid-
ing at the end of August 1998, it was very under-
standable that the Malaysian authorities chose to try
to stem further haemorrhage by adopting capital and
currency controls. It was not possible for them to
predict that United States Fed would finally respond
to the East Asian crisis after over a year of blaming
its main victims as well as poor corporate govern-
ance in the region, supposedly rooted in ￿Asian val-
ues￿ and manifested in cronyism and other ￿bad￿
business practices.
However, in September 1998, it became clear
that the Federal Reserve had coordinated a private
sector bailout for LTCM. Soon, it also reduced
United States interest rates, which stemmed, if not
reversed capital outflows from East Asia, allowing
East Asian currencies to rise and stabilize signifi-
cantly in the last quarter of 1998. In some important
regards, the suddenly improved regional fortunes
rendered the Malaysian controls unnecessary, if not
irrelevant, but this, of course, could not have been
foreseen when the decision to adopt the measures
was being made late in the previous month.
Thailand, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea
had received IMF emergency credit and had been
initially subject to contractionary policy condition-
alities, which exacerbated the regional recessions.
While insisting on strict monetary policies despite
their earlier deflationary impact, the Fund seemed
more willing to abandon its earlier insistence on ￿fis-
cal discipline￿, perhaps after belatedly recognizing
that most of the East Asian crisis economies (except
Indonesia) had been running budgetary surpluses for
years. Thus, by late 1998, the IMF had also been
forced to lift its curbs on counter-cyclical (reflation-
ary) fiscal policies by allowing budgetary deficits.
Malaysia￿s recession continued over the next
two quarters, through the last quarter of 1998 and
the first quarter of 1999, in effect lagging behind
the hesitant recoveries of the three economies under
IMF tutelage, including Indonesia, in the first quar-
ter of 1999. However, by the end of 1999, it was
clear that the Malaysian recovery was stronger than
its Southeast Asian neighbours, only lagging behind
the Republic of Korea. But so many things were
going on that it is impossible to attribute the Malaysian
difference, for better or worse, to the September 1998
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ponents and opponents from doing so, as it suits
them.
For instance, the IMF had been forced to re-
vise its policy advice and allowed fiscal reflationary
efforts with budgetary deficits from mid-1998 in the
East Asian economies under its tutelage. Ironically,
of the four economies, only Malaysia had maintained
a (small) budget surplus in 1997 although it was not
under any IMF programme. It is quite possible that
the V-shaped economic recoveries achieved by the
major crisis-hit economies of East Asia were due to
these fiscal reflationary efforts despite the IMF￿s own
predictions of protracted slowdowns and eventual
U-shaped recoveries. It is difficult to assess and com-
pare the effects of such fiscal measures. Besides the
size of the fiscal deficits, it is also important to con-
sider other relevant factors such as the nature of the
fiscal packages and the strength of domestic eco-
nomic linkages and multiplier effects.
As is well known, the control measures were
only part of a package of measures to revive the
Malaysian economy. Focusing solely on the control
measures ignores the significance of the other
measures. It is logically possible for the effects of
successful controls to have been wiped out by the
failure of accompanying programmes, or vice versa.
The IMF imposed different policy packages on the
other East Asian economies that sought emergency
credit facilities from the Fund. And to varying ex-
tents, the different national authorities were able to
differentially implement and enforce the packages
as well as other policies not specified in the pack-
ages. It is important for other developing country
governments to recognize that the packages and their
actual implementation were often the outcomes of
hard-fought battles, in which different fiscal capaci-
ties, negotiating and implementation capabilities as
well as national experiences all had bearings on the
outcomes.
Very importantly, the conceptualization, financ-
ing, governance and implementation of national asset
management corporations involved in bank and cor-
porate debt restructuring were especially crucial in
shaping the nature, speed and strength of national
economic recovery as well as corporate capacities
and capabilities. Also, it is likely that climatic and
other environmental factors ￿ such as ￿El Nino￿, ￿La
Nina￿ as well as large and protracted forest fires ￿
had greater effects on agricultural output than the
financial crisis itself.
The forced mergers in the wake of the crisis
have been poorly conceived, if not downright bi-
ased, and less likely to achieve their ostensible ends.
The authorities￿ push for the rapid merger of banks
and financial companies do not seem well designed
to enhance efficiency and competitiveness beyond
achieving economies of scale and reducing some
wasteful duplication and redundancy. While the con-
solidation of the financial sector may be desirable
to achieve economies and other advantages of scale
in anticipation of further financial liberalization, the
acceleration of its pace in response to the crisis
seemed less well conceived except to take advan-
tage of the financial institutions￿ weakness and
vulnerability during the crisis.
The efficacy of the Malaysian controls was also
due to their effective design. Many market-based
sceptics did not consider the Malaysian authorities
capable of designing and implementing such con-
trols, but now concede that they were proven wrong.
They seemingly addressed the immediate problem
identified by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001), and aspects
were subsequently revised from early 1999 as the
authorities reviewed their assessment of the situa-
tion and sought to demonstrate their commitment to
market and investor friendliness. Most importantly,
they emphasized from the outside that the measures
were directed at currency speculation, and not FDI.
Although FDI to Malaysia has declined since 1996,
this has been true globally since the last 1990s, and
of the Southeast Asian region as a whole (including
Singapore), with China and a few others being the
only exceptions.
Johnson and Mitton (2001; 2003) have argued
that the Malaysian capital controls provided a ￿screen
behind which favoured firms could be supported￿.
If this claim is true, the analysis of how such firms
were supported would have to shift to the other meas-
ures introduced in order to provide such support since
the controls only provided a protective screen in this
view. However, the Johnson and Mitton evidence
point to a significantly greater appreciation of the
prices of shares associated with the surviving politi-
cal leadership in the month right after the introduc-
tion of controls, i.e. before such other support could
have been provided except in a small minority of
cases. Hence, an alternative interpretation more con-
sistent with their evidence is that investors expected
the September 1998 measures to principally benefit
crony companies, causing their share prices to ap-
preciate much more than others.21 Malaysia￿s September 1998 Controls: Background, Context, Impacts, Comparisons, Implications, Lessons
There are ongoing debates as to whether the
continued retention of the September 1998 controls,
albeit in modified forms, are in Malaysia￿s best
interests. The capital controls per se ended in Sep-
tember 1999 with a whimper, while the surviving
currency controls have a different rationale, ex-
plained by Mahathir in terms of the desirability of a
fixed exchange rate. In fact, for some time now, the
Malaysian authorities have been trying to revive the
very same portfolio investment inflows which ended
in capital flight from late 1993 and again, from mid-
1997. There have not been any efforts to re-introduce
the controls on inflows introduced in early 1994 and
withdrawn half a year later, or any similar meas-
ures. Rather, the regime pointed gleefully to the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Composite
Index (KLCI) recovery after September 1998. Key
economic policies seem to be primarily concerned
with seeking to bolster the stock market, which many
blame for the EPF￿s loss of over RM10 billion in
1998.
For many critics, the undervalued pegged
ringgit has also had negative implications for a broad
recovery, which depends upon imported inputs. It is
not clear that the peg has really given a major boost
to exports. There are costs to maintaining an under-
valued ringgit, especially in the context of an eco-
nomic upturn of what is still a very open economy.
An undervalued ringgit may help some exports in
the short term, but it also makes imports of capital
and intermediate goods more expensive, thus im-
peding recovery and capacity expansion in the me-
dium term (the evolution of Malaysia￿s exports and
GDP growth is shown in figure 3). Malaysia￿s trade
surplus has declined as the import compression due
to the undervalued ringgit declined. Together with
an apparently stubborn negative services balance,
this has meant a reduced current account surplus with
the economic upturn.
While there is a need to continue to press ahead
for international financial reform as well as for new
regional monetary arrangements in the absence of
adequate global reform, there seems to be little to
be gained by retaining the present regime of cur-
rency controls. It may even be argued that their re-
tention provides a false sense of security as it was
designed to deal with problems which are no longer
around and unlikely to recur in their previous form.
Figure 3
MALAYSIA: GROWTH RATE OF EXPORTS AND GDP, 1994￿2003
(Per cent change over previous year)
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Instead, if the regime succeeds in attracting short-
term portfolio capital, as various subsequent amend-
ments to the regime have sought to do, it would be
largely ineffective in the event of another currency
and financial panic. The remaining 1998 controls
on outflows can be dismantled while introducing an
adequate and effective regulatory framework to re-
duce financial vulnerability and to moderate capital
flow surges into and out of the country. Malaysia
should not be completely defenceless against another
round of speculative attacks. While Malaysia can
afford to return to ringgit convertibility, this should
be phased in with effective measures to ensure the
non-internationalization of the ringgit to reduce vul-
nerability to external currency speculation. This can
include measures such as not permitting offshore
ringgit accounts as well as non-resident borrowing
of ringgit.
Clearly, the Malaysian controls did not lead to
the unmitigated disaster promised by its most stri-
dent critics. On the contrary, there is little evidence
of any serious harm to the Malaysian economy that
can be attributed to the introduction of the controls.
However, this is different from asserting that the
controls have had no adverse impacts whatsoever. It
is difficult to prove that the continued existence of
the controls have had absolutely no negative effects
on desired long-term foreign direct investments,
though of course, reduced FDI since 1996 cannot be
attributed to the September 1998 measures. The
Malaysian authorities have attributed the FDI de-
cline since 1996 to misunderstandings and mis-
perceptions, and have had to spend inordinate energy
and resources trying to correct these ￿misimpressions￿.
Confidence in the Malaysian Government￿s
policy consistency and credibility was seriously un-
dermined by the apparent reversal of policy, as were
years of successful investment promotion efforts.
The controls regime has thus been seen as counter-
productive in terms of the overall consistency of
government policy and may have had some adverse
medium-term, indeed long-term, consequences. The
problem may have been exacerbated by the Prime
Minister￿s declared intention to retain the regime
until the international financial system is reformed.
Hence, the Government phased out the September
1998 and subsequent capital and currency control
measures in light of their ambiguous contribution to
economic recovery and the adverse consequences
of retaining the measures. This has not been helped
by unnecessarily hostile and sometimes ill-informed
official rhetoric, though the Mahathir administration
has since sometimes sought to ￿improve￿ change its
international image, especially since the events of
11 September 2001.
Since the desired reforms to the international
financial architecture are unlikely to materialize in
the foreseeable future, the Malaysian Government
should institute a permanent, but flexible, market-
based regime of prudential controls to moderate
capital inflows and deter speculative surges, both
domestic and foreign, to avert future crises. This
would include a managed float of the currency with
convertibility, but no internationalization, meaning,
minimally, no offshore ringgit accounts and limits
on off-shore foreign exchange accounts, and limits
on foreign borrowings.
There is clearly also an urgent need for some
degree of monetary co-operation in the region. It is
now clear that currency and financial crises have a
primarily regional character. Hence, regional co-
operation is a necessary first step towards the
establishment of an East Asian monetary facility.
Only responsible Malaysian relations with its neigh-
bours will contribute to realising such regional
co-operation.
The window of opportunity offered by the capi-
tal controls regime has been abused by certain
powerfully-connected business interests, not only to
secure publicly funded bail-outs at public expense,
but even to consolidate and extend their corporate
domination, especially in the crucial financial sec-
tor. Capital controls have been part of a package
focused on saving friends of the regime, usually at
the public expense. For example, while ostensibly not
involving public funds, the government-sponsored
￿restructuring￿ of the ruling party-linked Renong
conglomerate will cost the government, and hence
the public, billions of ringgit in foregone toll and
tax revenue. Also, non-performing loans (NPLs) of
the thrice-bankrupted Bank Bumiputera ￿ taken over
by politically well-connected banking interests ￿
have not been heavily discounted like other banks￿
NPLs, although it has long abandoned its ostensible
￿social agenda￿ of helping the politically dominant
Bumiputera community.
Other elements in the Malaysian Government￿s
economic strategy since then reinforce the impres-
sion that the capital control measures were probably
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desire to protect politically well-connected businesses.
For example, the Malaysian ringgit￿s exchange rate
was pegged against the dollar in the afternoon of
2 September 1998, hours before the Deputy Prime
Minister and the Minister of Finance Anwar Ibrahim
was relieved of his functions, probably to pre-empt
currency volatility and speculation. Malaysia￿s 1998
experiment with capital controls has thus been seen
as compromised by political bias, vested interests
and inappropriate policy instruments. However, it
would be a serious mistake to reject the desirability
of capital controls on account of the flawed Malaysian
experience.
Capital controls on outflows and other such
efforts to prop up a currency already under attack
may be ineffective and may actually unwittingly
subsidize further speculative actions. Instead, meas-
ures to insulate the domestic banking system from
short-term volatility through regulatory measures
and capital controls on easily reversible short-term
inflows as well as stricter prudential regulation and
supervision may be far more effective and sustain-
able. International co-operation and co-ordination
have often not only provided the best responses dur-
ing crisis episodes, but have also been important for
effective prudential and regulatory initiatives as well
as to reduce ￿policy arbitrage￿.
Annex 1
Capital controls
There are many different types of capital con-
trol measures, with different consequences, often
varying with circumstances as much as the nature
of the instruments. Until capital account liberaliza-
tion from the eighties, most countries retained some
such controls despite significant current account lib-
eralization in the post-war period. Most such
measures can only be understood historically, in
terms of their original purposes, and there are no
ready-made packages available for interested gov-
ernments.
Economists favouring capital account liberali-
zation have made three main arguments in favour of
such a policy. It is argued that capital will tend to
flow from capital-rich to capital-poor economies, or
between economies with different savings rates,
investment opportunities, risk profiles or even de-
mographic patterns. Capital flows thus enable na-
tional economies to trade imports in the present for
imports in the future, i.e. to engage in inter-tempo-
ral trade. Capital flows also allow national economies
to offset pressures to reduce imports by borrowing
from abroad or by selling assets to foreigners. Such
imports and borrowings may be used to enhance na-
tional economic output capacity, i.e. a country￿s
ability to increase production in the future. The fore-
going arguments are similar to those for international
trade liberalization. Foreign direct investment is also
expected to involve technology transfer, which
should enhance industrial capabilities. Restrictions
on capital flows are considered undesirable by ad-
vocates of capital account liberalization because they
prevent capital from being utilized where it is most
demanded.
On the other hand, advocates of capital con-
trols emphasize the adverse effects of free capital
flows on national economic policy-making and
implementation, or worse still, by undermining eco-
nomic stability. Any policy intended to restrict or
redirect capital account transactions can be consid-
ered a capital control. These would include taxes,
price or quantity controls, including bans on trade
in certain kinds of assets. Hence, there are many
different kinds of capital controls, which may be
introduced for various reasons. The effects of spe-
cific controls may change over time and could be-
come quite different from what may have been
intended. The major reasons advanced for the in-
troduction of capital controls have included the fol-
lowing:
1. Achieve greater leeway for monetary policy,
e.g. to reflate the economy.
2. Enhance macroeconomic stability by limiting
potentially volatile capital inflows.
3. Secure exchange rate stability, e. g. protect a
fixed exchange rate or peg.
4. Correct international payments imbalances,
both deficits and surpluses.
5. Avoid inflation due to excessive inflows.
6. Avoid real currency appreciation due to mon-
etary expansion.
7. Reduce financial instability by changing the
composition of ￿ or limiting ￿ capital inflows.
8. Restrict foreign ownership of domestic assets,
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9. Ensure the domestic utilization of national sav-
ings by restricting outflows.
10. Enable governments to allocate credit domes-
tically without risking capital flight.
11. Enable domestic financial houses to attain scale
economies in order to better compete interna-
tionally.
12. Facilitate revenue generation, particularly taxa-
tion of wealth and interest income; by allowing
higher inflation, more revenue can be generated.
Capital controls may well be the most accept-
able alternative to the destabilizing effects of capital
flows on inadequately regulated financial systems
characteristic of developing economies. Effective
regulation may be compromised by limited capabili-
ties and experience, fewer personnel and other
resources as well as politically or otherwise com-
promised regulatory capacity. When a country with
a fixed exchange rate experiences a net capital out-
flow, it can either raise interest rates or devalue. But
with a sudden large capital outflow, usually associ-
ated with easily reversible capital inflows, either
option is likely to exert strong recessionary pres-
sures due to higher interest rates or further capital
flight. Monetary contraction may not only dampen
economic activity with higher interest rates, but may
also adversely affect the economy through the (in-
variably government-guaranteed) banking system,
which may be exposed to foreign borrowings.
Capital controls may be used to limit capital
flow volatility to achieve greater economic stability
by checking outflows in the event of crisis or influ-
encing the volume or composition of inflows. Sudden
massive capital outflows ￿ usually attributable to
herd behaviour ￿ are more likely to occur in devel-
oping countries for various reasons. The greater
likelihood of asset price changes to cause further
changes in the same direction increases the likeli-
hood of greater volatility as well as boom-bust
cycles. Discouraging capital inflows would reduce
the quantity of capital that might take flight at short
notice. But changing the composition of capital in-
flows ￿ e.g. to favour foreign direct investments as
opposed to more liquid portfolio investments ￿ may
well better reduce such instability.
Different types of capital controls may be dis-
tinguished by the types of asset transactions they
affect as well as by the very nature of the control
measure itself, e.g. tax, limit, or ban. Capital con-
trols are not identical with exchange controls though
the two are often closely related in practice. Ex-
change controls mainly involve monetary assets
(currency and bank deposits), and may be used to
control the current account of the balance of payments
rather than the capital account. While exchange con-
trols function as ￿a type of limited capital control,
they are neither necessary to restrict capital move-
ment nor are they necessarily intended to control
capital account transactions￿ (Neely, 1999: 21￿22).
Some of the major differences among the types of
capital controls involve:
1. Taxes versus quantitative controls: Taxes rely
on price or market mechanisms to deter certain
types of flows. Such taxes may be on certain
types of transactions or returns to foreign in-
vestment, or may even involve mandatory
reserve requirements, which raise the cost of
the flows concerned. Quantitative controls may
involve quotas, authorization requirements or
even outright bans.
2. Controls on inflows as opposed to outflows:
Limits on inflows may allow for higher inter-
est rates, to check money supply and inflation.
Checks on outflows allow lower interest rates
and greater money supply than would other-
wise be possible, and have often been used to
postpone hard choices between devaluation and
tighter monetary policy, as with the September
1998 controls in Malaysia.
3. Controls on different types of inflows, especially
in terms of expected duration: Governments
may seek to encourage long-term inflows (e.g.
foreign direct investment) while discouraging
short-term (e.g. bank loans or money market
instruments) or easily reversible (portfolio in-
vestments) inflows.
It is important to establish at the outset what
particular controls seek to achieve. With the benefit
of hindsight, it is crucial to determine to what extent
the measures actually achieve their declared objec-
tives as well as their other consequences, intended
or otherwise. For instance, it is important to know
whether specific controls are meant to avert crisis
or to assist recovery. In its 1998 Trade and Devel-
opment Report, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recommended
capital controls as means to avoid financial crises.
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Professor Paul Krugman from the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology (MIT) recommended capital
controls in his Fortune magazine column in early
September 1998 to create a window of opportunity
to facilitate economic recovery ￿ which is a differ-
ent objective, though some of the mechanisms
or processes involved may not be altogether different.
Annex 2
Malaysia￿s 1994 temporary controls
on inflows
The September 1998 capital controls were not
completely unprecedented. In fact, temporary capi-
tal controls had been introduced in early 1994 after
an earlier experience of massive capital flight with
the sudden reversal of massive net portfolio capital
inflows in 1992￿93. The 1994 measures sought to
deter capital inflows by taxing them, unlike the 1998
measures that restricted capital outflows. If they had
not been withdrawn so soon, it is quite likely that
the magnitude of capital flight from mid-1997 would
have been much less, and the 1997￿98 crisis would
have been less catastrophic.
The controls ￿ introduced after the sudden col-
lapse of the Malaysian stock market in early 1994 ￿
were soon withdrawn after about half a year, with-
out introducing a more permanent regime of market-
based controls that could be flexibly adjusted in
response to policy priorities and concerns. The Cen-
tral Bank saw the problem as one of excess liquidity
due to the massive inflow of short-term funds from
abroad due to higher interest rates in Malaysia, the
buoyant stock market and expectations of ringgit
appreciation. Several monetary measures were in-
troduced during early 1994, which were gradually
phased out during the course of the year. The fol-
lowing measures sought to manage excess liquidity,
especially to contain speculative inflows, restore sta-
bility in financial markets and control inflationary
measures; for a fuller account. See BNM￿s 1994
Annual Report (especially the foreword, boxes A to J
and pages 42￿44):
￿ The eligible liabilities base for computing statu-
tory reserve and liquidity requirements was
redefined to include all funds inflows from
abroad, thus raising the cost of foreign funds
compared to domestic funds.
￿ Limits on non trade-related external liabilities
of banking institutions were introduced; net ex-
ternal liabilities of the banking system declined
from a peak of RM35.4 billion in early Janu-
ary 1994 to RM10.3 billion at the end of 1994.
￿ Sale of short-term monetary instruments was
limited only to Malaysian residents to prevent
foreigners from using such investments as sub-
stitutes for placements of deposits (this measure
was lifted on 12 August 1994).
￿ Commercial banks were required to place
ringgit funds of foreign banks in non-interest
bearing vostro accounts.
￿ Commercial banks were not permitted to un-
dertake non-trade-related swaps (including
overnight swaps) and outright forward trans-
actions on the bid side with foreign customers
to prevent offshore parties from establishing
speculative long forward ringgit positions while
the ringgit was perceived to be undervalued
(this measure was lifted from 16 August 1994).
￿ The statutory reserve requirements of all finan-
cial institutions were raised thrice during 1994
￿ by one percentage point each time ￿ to ab-
sorb excess liquidity on a more permanent
basis, absorbing an estimated RM4.8 billion
from the banking system.26 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 36
Notes
1 In 1998, the Statutory Reserve Ratio (SRR) was brought
down abruptly from 13.5 per cent ￿ to which it had been
raised in 1996￿97 to contain liquidity as part of an ini-
tially orthodox response to downward pressure on the
ringgit ￿ to 4 per cent (Rajaraman, 2003, table 15). As
banks were not keen to lend to private sector customers
after the crisis began, they bought the government bonds
used to finance the Danaharta asset management agency
(to restore bank liquidity by taking over NPLs) and the
Danamodal bank re-capitalization agency.
2 The benchmark was 0.8 (3-month inter bank rate),
(1-SRR), (BNM, 1999).
3 After being persuaded by Thillainathan initially, I am
now more sympathetic to Kaplan and Rodrik after
Thillainathan￿s failure to offer supporting evidence.
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